Decentralization effects on environmental policy in Karimunjawa National Park
Below is a book chapter I published in, “Democratization, Decentralization, and Local Dynamics in Contemporary Indonesia” Edited by: George T. Iqbal, Andrew D. Garner, and Joko Purnomo.
I don’t believe in gatekeeping information behind pay walls. If this helps someone further their research, I am happy to help. The only stipulation, please cite the author if you do use.
Don’t take what’s not yours without asking and crediting the original person’s thoughts.
Decentralization effects on environmental policy in Karimunjawa National Park
By Thao Nguyen
Decentralization has lingering effects on management of Karimunjawa National Park (KNP). Karimunjawa is situated in the Central Java Province of Indonesia. KNP is one of seven national marine protected area in Indonesia. Marine protected areas (MPAs), “…have the potential to conserve marine resources as well as provide social and economic benefits to local communities” KNP is managed with a cooperative management system, also known as ‘co-management’. This research uses the co-management theory to explain the experiences in Karimunjawa National Park.
Indonesia’s government has committed to protecting 20 million ha by 2020 and declared goals to bring Indonesia back into being a maritime nation in the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia’s commitment to these goals illustrate the value and importance of marine protected areas. The legal framework regarding coastal and marine resource management outlines the legal justification for MPAs, but the reason may not have an emphasis on socio-ecological benefits.
The Indonesian government recognizes the importance of MPAs. National law defines MPAs as water areas that are protected and managed through a zoning system to achieve sustainable management of fish resources and environmental conservation. Two functions of MPAs are to protect marine biodiversity of global value and maintain sustainable utilization of marine recourse, especially for marine capture fisheries. Despite the importance of MPAs and regulations, the world database on protected areas list 248 MPAs in Indonesia, which only cover 1.94% of the territorial seas. National Indonesian law and legal framework supports MPAs, but contributing factors such as decentralization, participation, enforcement, and compliance levels are not fulfilling Karimunjawa’s local community’s needs. Survey participants expressed their suggestions for change. This research expands upon their suggestions and calls for future research to include institutional analysis and reconsider the source of MPA goals.
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are defined multiple ways with various types and locations around the world. International agencies such as the International Union for Conservation of the Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which is a program under the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), has a comprehensive definition setting the international standard. The IUCN defines MPAs as,“”…any area reserved by law or effective means to protect marine species and natural areas of high biodiversity (coral reefs), which serve to promote marine conservation to the vast majority of humankind’”. Since the 1970s, MPAs have proven a powerful tool for marine conservation. The UNEP reviewed MPAs globally, in 2013, and approximated that there are only 10,280 MPAs. Despite the vital importance to marine conservation, MPAs only cover 2.8 percent of the oceans. During an Association of Southeast Asian Nations conference on biodiversity, one paper argued climate change, runoff, and overfishing are the three key threats to biodiversity of coral reefs. It emphasized preventative actions rather than reactionary cure and after effects of climate change.
MPAs, “…have the potential to conserve marine resources as well as provide social and economic benefits to local communities” The extensive scholarly literature illustrate numerous factors such as climate change, religion, economics, etc. effecting MPA outcomes. This research will focus on the conservation and political narratives regarding local compliance and governance. Both derive from the inherently problematic consequences of decentralization in Indonesia. Although there are existing laws and classifications for MPAs, decentralization continues to complicate potential social and ecological benefits. In theory, implementing decentralization increases government accountability and the role of local communities in natural resource management.
An overview of Indonesia’s legislative framework for coastal and marine management is necessary. The figure above illustrates the varying national governmental organizations with marine protected area authority. The Indonesian national government established the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishers (MMAF) in 1999, but action from MMAF would not come until several years later. There are four hierarchies of governance claiming authority of marine resources: national, provincial, district, and city. Local entities are responsible for managing coastal resources and enforcing regulations. Provincial has authority covering twelve nautical miles from the coastline. District and city has authority for one-third of provincial areas, which is four nautical miles from the coastline.
Each level of Indonesia’s multi-governance structure enacts and develops their own autonomous laws and decrees, which creates hierarchical confliction of interests. For example, government acts No. 22/1999 and No. 25/1999 grant local autonomy and establish a decentralized national government, otherwise known as the Decentralization Law. While also, operating under the basic constitution of 1945 stating that land, water, and natural resources shall be controlled by the state and, “…utilized for the greatest benefit of or welfare of the people” (69). Normally, this would act as a cohesive functionality of two interdependent governing bodies, but each level exhibits distinct political and conservation narratives. Multiple levels of governance and conflicting hierarchical laws create an underdeveloped and “inappropriate legal framework” for MPAs. For example, Bali’s district operates under customary and religious norms with regional autonomy, while adhering to the basic national constitution. Wardana’s research reveals Bali’s dualistic system is “unsuitable for Bali” because district elites tend to “exploit their resources”. Consequently, causing issues of legitimacy and distrust, distorts local perception of governance, and create an environment for non-compliance. The flow chart figure below illustrates a quasi-simplistic chain of command regarding the Indonesian hierarchical decentralized governing system.
In addition to the decentralization law, Indonesian Law No.32 and 33/2004 and revision of Law No. 12/2008 allows for direct election of local government leader, which gives local government the optimal benefits to manage coastal resources These laws dismantles the hierarchical relationship between provincial, district, and city entities and grants local governments authority to modify laws to fit their local conditions. Tikson describes Indonesia’s decentralization having political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions. Local autonomy has been embraced, but the economic and political reform have not quickly followed. Consequently, this law was revised by Law 1/2014. This law created a new permit system for boats and placed utilization restrictions on foreign enterprises in Indonesian coastal waters. In order to increase support, the central government has created new environmental regulations. This simultaneously generates economic utility, while satisfying interest groups who want regulations to increase conservation efforts. Siry uses these laws to support his claim that decentralization is encouraging a broad stakeholder participation in a place-based cooperative management structure.
Although decentralization grants local autonomy, it subsequently creates unequal preference towards local elites and marginalizes others. Wever et al. illustrate public participation and active involvement “remains incipient and fragmented”, while decentralization empowers local authorities. Every individual has the potential to contribute and affect MPA outcomes. In a participatory democracy, each individual is entitled to their voice and opinion regarding their social, economic, and ecological outcomes. If the local elites are controlling natural resource policies without other considerations, disenfranchised individuals will be disengaged and unresponsive towards environmental regulations and policies. “Conservation success is often predicted on local support for conservation which is strongly influenced by perception of the impact that are experienced by local communities and opinions of management and governance”. In this case, marginalized individuals and groups are then subjected to a failed and ineffective system of governance.
Decentralization has effectively lead to inefficient governance, participation failure, and distributive injustices among Indonesians. Several researchers illustrate how low levels of local participation and social exclusion in MPAs of Indonesia are a result of unsuccessful implementation of decentralization and significantly contributes to the political and conservation discourse. Siry’s research discusses the ecological degradation that happened after the decentralization law. The local governments were unprepared and mismanaged coastal resources. However, Siry argues that these decentralization laws actually supports co-management, promotes a system of share responsibilities, and recognizes the need to promote local community roles.
In response, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries finally enacted the Coastal Zone and Small Island Management Act (RUU Pesisir) as Law 27/2007. The law recognizes the need for an integrated decision-making framework, provides incentives-based programs to implement the decentralized coastal management, and provides provisions for monitoring, evaluation, conflict resolution, and funding. An additional six technical regulations were enacted thereafter to ensure local governments meeting a minimal coastal management standard, while the central government continues to provide incentives to well-performing programs.
Furthermore, Indonesia is a rising power in Southeast Asia with a crucial need for MPAs. Indonesia’s global and regional significance are best described as an economic growing clout with high population, vast environmental space, and abundance in natural resources. It has over five million square kilometers of territorial sea, approximately 250 designated marine protected areas, and holds 16.5% of the global coral reefs. Indonesia ranks fifteenth in the world in terms of their economy and fourth most populous country. Indonesia has a strategic geopolitical position in Southeast Asia. Around ninety percent of the world’s aquaculture occurs in the Asia-Pacific with Indonesia having the highest fish consumption in the region.”
Indonesia is a key area for MPAs due to some of the highest concentration of biodiversity on earth. Normative implications such as biodiversity, coastal protection, and economic value are essential attributes of MPAs. Surrounding MPAs are known for high concentrations of endangered species, such as turtles, whales, mollusks, and numerous coral reef fish exclusive to that ecosystem. Mangroves and coral reefs offer land protection from erosion and storm damages. Marine ecosystems, such as coral reefs, absorbs tidal wave forces, and protect from coastal degradation and tsunamis. Many Indonesian livelihoods depend on the sustainability and effectiveness of MPAs. The UNEP defines effectiveness as, “the degree to which the ecological management objectives of a MPA are being fulfilled, particularly with regard to biodiversity and sustainable resource use.” MPAs can effectively improve livelihoods and quality of life for local citizens. Beyond a source of income, citizens living on the coast also depend on the ocean as a source of food.
MPAs, such as Karimunjawa National Park and Wakatobi National Park, in Indonesia have evolved from a top-down approach to a co-managed approach and goes beyond formal partnerships. The focus is on economic, ecological, and equity using learning-based approaches. Co-management presupposes that all parties have agreed upon an arrangement. Thus, Indonesia has shifted focus towards knowledge generation and learning. One example, Karimunjawa Islands exemplifies this co-managed governing structure.
Cooperative management is a decentralized partnership between stakeholders to share decision making authority of natural resources. The theory states that when the governing process includes the local community, the increased participation levels will also increase compliance. One study in 2011 found that nearly 70% of the respondents were not involved in the decisions making process and 85% of respondents were not involved in the decision-making process related to natural resource regulations. Then, Campbell et al.’s study states that the KNP rezoning process in 2012 included “extensive community consultation” and “self-organized village planning groups”. However, the results show that 93% of respondents from multiple stakeholder groups still have not participated in management planning.
Since 2005, Karimunjawa National Park has governed the MPA using co-management. Results show that the majority of the community understands that they must care for their natural resources. Stakeholders believe that it is very important for the community to work together to protect their natural resources, but participation in management is deficient. The 2004 rezoning planning process also had low community participation. Only 2 out of 83 respondents reported being involved in management planning and 63% reported not knowing anyone who was involved. Even if respondents were not involved, it is surprising that many did not know anyone who was actually involved. This disconnect alludes to a possible explanation for the levels of non-compliance. The results also indicate participation levels are still low, but the perception of community involvement is high. Despite 63% saying they do not know anyone involved, 83% report that management has included the community. This indicates the image of co-management is inclusive, while not actually being inclusive. When the community is not involved, there is a missed opportunity for education, awareness, increased compliance, biodiversity, and biomass. Eleven years of co-management still has not produced a comprehensive level of participation.
Yuliana et al. reported the fisher population in 2014 was 2,633. The results from this small case study found only 1 out of 35 fishermen reported involvement in management planning. This is not a robust representation of the true fisher population in Karimunjawa, but it adds to the previous research regarding fishermen’s perception and level of participation. The one fisher believes others violate because they are unaware and they have to fulfill their daily needs. This suggests awareness programs are inadequate. Fifty-one percent of respondents share this same sentiment. Lack of education and awareness are reported as the reason for violations. Simply not caring follows as the second reason for non-compliance. After eleven years of co-management, there seems to still be a need for education of MPA regulations.
The Balai 2012 rezoning document explicitly states that the public consultation process included only residents from Karimunjawa, Kemujan, and Parang. The total number of residents at the public consultation meetings is 112. The population of all Karimunjawa’s islands is between 9,000-10,000 residents. The lack of participation in the decision making process excludes the input and knowledge of local community members. Community involvement in the design and management process is said to increase compliance. This may explain the decreased level of non-compliance in KNP. National law stipulates a rezoning process every five years. KNP is due for another rezoning in 2017. Public consultations should seek to include a more robust number of residents and conduct public consultation on all five inhabited islands in Karimunjawa.
The results illustrate KNP enforcement efforts are still lacking. The community agrees with regulations for environmental benefits, but it is not enough to increase compliance. Campbell et al. report minimal enforcement efforts that include: eight patrolling convoys a year, no prosecution or fines imposed for violating spatial restrictions, no prosecution of violating local community members. There is a three limit warning system in place for locals and non-compliance. Violators are “coached” and given explanations as to why they should not violate the rules. Their names are recorded, but that is the extent of enforcement for locals. KNPA has concerns with prosecuting locals. They believe punishing locals gives the Balai a negative reputation and image. One employee said that it is hard to punish when it is your neighbor or in-laws. They do not want to be hated because KNP is a small community. Balai cited the need to maintain a healthy and viable relationship with locals to build trust and cooperation. One Balai employee cited that it is hard to catch marine and coral violations because it is not easily seen in comparison to a tree in the forest that has been cut down. As a result, 87% responded that enforcement rarely occurs. However, the perception of law enforcement and those who get away with it are a close split. Fifty-five percent had positive responses of law enforcement and 51% do not believe that violators get away with non-compliance. Several respondents, including governing officials and NGO employees, cited the need for less leniency. One NGO employee said that the reason for leniency is because the KNPA cite that it is not their jurisdiction to prosecute community members for non-compliance. Several government employees attribute the lack of cooperation among various government levels as the reason for inefficient enforcement. The decentralized system creates a complex hierarchy of governance. Thus, increasing the number of governing entities needing to coordinate. Other governing officials state that laws are weak and there are ways to buy oneself out of prosecution. If the community believes enforcement is rare and there is a high chance of get away with non-compliance, non-compliance is more likely to occur. This could explain the low levels of biomass in KNP.
Previous research focused on spatial compliance. In 2015, Yuliana et al.’s study found core and protected zone compliance decreased from 84% between 2009-2001 to an average of 78% between 2010-2014. Yuliana et al.’s found a decrease in spatial compliance. Similarly, results from this thesis research show 57% of respondents indicating that are fishers who do not comply with fishing regulations. Perception of non-compliance is high. The perception of rare enforcement activities and high non-compliance alludes to the legitimacy and efficacy of co-management. Eleven years of co-management and biomass has not increased.
This research illustrates a nuanced view of compliance. Fishing gear and destructive fishing practices are the main focus of this research. Respondents were asked about their perception levels of destructive fishing and type of fishing gear. Destructive fishing such as bomb, potassium, and Danish net fishing has decreased, but there could be other reasons for this decline. One person said that destructive practices have decreased because fish biomass has decreased. There is no need to destructively fish if there are no fish. The decline in biomass is not driven by habitat destruction. Campbell et al. study found coral coverage increased in all zones. While fishing gear is not destroying the habitat, it is increasingly decreasing the fish population. This combined with the decrease in spatial compliance suggest the reasoning for decreased biomass, despite increased coral coverage.
Fishermen believe that gear restrictions generally have a negative impact on fish catch. Some understand that is it good for the environment, but not personally beneficial. Fishermen report using non-destructive fishing gear. However, 43% of fishermen report using compressors. Compressors do not directly destroy coral reefs, but it does increase fish catch. This indicates the disconnect between fishing gear and levels of biomass. Many fishers still use compressors for fishing and do not understand why it is illegal. This indicates an educational opportunity to coach fishermen about the health and safety concerns of compression fishing.
Results also show that there is an opportunity for community participation in enforcement. When asked what would they do if they saw non-compliance, majority responded with action. Many responded with reporting, confronting, or apprehending the offender. These community members could create social sanctions against non-compliance and increase the low levels enforcement. This would also increase perception levels of enforcement, even if it is not directly from governing officials.
Low levels of compliance, awareness, and enforcement questions the legitimacy of co-management governance. This western concept of conservation has managed KNP for nearly eleven years and has been through two rezoning processes. Perhaps this western concept of conservation and multiple-use MPAs is not the most efficient way to manage MPAs in Indonesia.
